Abstract-As information and communication networks are highly interconnected with the power grid, cyber security of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system has become a critical issue in the electric power sector. By exploiting the vulnerabilities in cyber components and intruding into the local area networks of the control center, corporation, substations, or by injecting false information into communication links, the attackers are able to eavesdrop critical data, reconfigure devices, and send trip commands to the intelligent electronic devices that control the system breakers. Reliability of the power system can thus be impacted by various cyber attacks. In this paper, four attack scenarios for cyber components in networks of the SCADA system are considered, which may trip breakers of physical components. Two Bayesian attack graph models are built to illustrate the attack procedures and to evaluate the probabilities of successful cyber attacks. A mean time-to-compromise model is modified and adopted considering the known and zero-day vulnerabilities on the cyber components, and the frequencies of intrusions through various paths are estimated. With increased breaker trips resulting from the cyber attacks, the loss of load probabilities in the IEEE reliability test system 79 are estimated. The simulation results demonstrate that the power system becomes less reliable as the frequency of successful attacks on the cyber components increases and the skill levels of attackers increase.
concerning the SCADA system is of vital importance [2] . As the open Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP)-based protocol is being developed and deployed between the SCADA and other networks of the power system, more effective cybersecurity policies are urgently needed. For instance, secure tunnels are required for power utilities, which are responsible for providing secure control and management to their substation automation systems [3] . However, improvement of the cybersecurity is a challenging task. The power system is composed of complicated physical components, and the ICT in power systems has evolved into a highly intertwined network, which is remote access enabled and Ethernet-based. In addition, a number of vulnerabilities can be found in the standard communication protocols of the power system, including distributed network protocol (DNP) 3.0 and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 61850 [4] .
The security of the cyber networks is severely threatened by vulnerabilities in the cyber components [5] . By exploiting either known or zero-day vulnerabilities [6] of cyber components in networks such as local area networks (LANs) of the SCADA control center, corporation, substation automation systems, or communication links between the control center and substations, critical cyber components in the networks can be manipulated. For instance, the root control of the human machine interface (HMI) in the substation LAN can be gained by remotely penetrating into a substation LAN. Intruders may also inject false data into or modify data on the communication links. The unauthorized trip signals and reconfiguration messages can be specified on the intruded components, which may then isolate corresponding transmission lines and generators [7] , [8] . The complicated cascading events may thereafter be triggered and exacerbate the operation of power systems [9] . Thus, it is of importance to evaluate the impact of cyber attacks on the power systems.
Vulnerabilities of cyber networks in the power system are being evaluated for quantifying their impact. Petri nets are used in [10] and [11] for the vulnerability evaluation. In [10] , a vulnerability assessment framework is proposed by utilizing the Petri net-based firewall and password models as protection schemes. In [11] , cyber-physical attacks against the smart grid are modeled using a hierarchical method, which combines several small Petri nets of cyber and physical domains. In [8] , by constructing a cyber-to-physical bridge, the cyber attack vectors and the reliability effects on the power grid are quantified and examined.
Several metrics have been proposed to quantify the impacts of cyber attacks on the SCADA system. For instance, in [12] , an attack tree model is built, and potential attack scenarios are constituted by combining different attack leaves. In [13] , a strategy of the quantitative risk reduction estimation was performed for the CS60 SCADA control system. The risk is assessed by evaluating the mean time needed for a successful cyber attack on the SCADA system, and the risk is reduced by patching the components and decreasing the number of vulnerabilities. In [3] , a testbed is built by simulating the processes of cyber attacks in the control center and substations. And by assigning various ratios to the cyber and power risk, a risk metric is defined to evaluate the relationship between the occurrence of cyber attacks and the resulting impact on the power service.
Cyber attacks have brought severe impacts to the power system. As a result, there are more uncertain factors which may affect the reliability of the cyber-physical power system. For instance, the change of the network topology of the power system will impact the flow, and the risk of the system may be increased [14] . A number of evaluations have been performed based on the characteristics of the physical system, but very limited quantitative work has been conducted on the impacts brought by the cyber attacks on the power system. In this paper, a mean time-to-compromise (MTTC) model [15] is extended and used to estimate the time intervals for successfully intruding cyber components in control networks. Breakers in the substations are then randomly tripped when the false commands are sent by the penetrated cyber components. In order to depict different attack paths, Bayesian networks (BN) are used for modeling all potential attack steps in a network [16] . Two Bayesian attack graph models [17] , [18] are modified and used to quantify various attack scenarios in the cyber networks of the power system. The first model is suitable for LANs of the control center, corporation, and substations. It is adopted to estimate the probabilities of successful vulnerability exploits to gain the root privileges of control components. Various MTTCs consumed by execution of exploits are calculated by considering the ratio of exploits. The second attack graph model is applied to evaluate the probability of successful attacks on the communication links between the control center and substations. This model decomposes a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack against the communication links into multiple sub-processes. Security countermeasures are implemented in the model to mitigate the damaging impacts of cyber attacks. And combinations of the MTTC consumed in exploiting the vulnerabilities of each countermeasure are the time interval of cyber attack on the links. Bayesian attack graph models and MTTC model are used to quantitatively estimate the probabilities and average frequencies of the successful attacks on the target cyber components of the SCADA system. With cyber attacks occurring on different scenarios, system breakers are forced to trip, which leads to the prolonged outage of physical components. And the reliability analysis of the power system is performed using the Monte Carlo simulation (MCS).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A SCADA system network architecture and four types of attack paths on the cyber networks of the SCADA system are discussed in Section II. In Section III, the background knowledge on the MTTC model is briefly reviewed. In Sections IV and V, two modified Bayesian attack graph models and the MTTC models are described and analyzed. In Section VI, by using the attack graph and MTTC models, the time intervals of successful attacks targeting various cyber networks are calculated. Also, the loss of load probability (LOLP) values for IEEE reliability test system 79 (RTS79) [19] are derived based on the MCS with the updated available intervals of physical components, and this paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. CYBER ATTACK SCENARIOS IN POWER SYSTEMS
A. Architecture of the Cyber Network in the SCADA System Fig. 1 illustrates a defense-in-depth security architecture of cyber networks in the SCADA system. The SCADA system in the power system is used to monitor and control distributed components from the control center to substations. At the same time, the status information measured from the substations is transmitted to the control center. By collecting the field information, transferring it to the central computer facility, and displaying the information to the operator through the HMI, the SCADA system enables the operator to monitor or control the entire power system in the control center.
The SCADA system is composed of both hardware and software. Typical hardware is known as components in the control center, such as front end processors (FEP), engineering workstations, and various servers which can store and process the data. The hardware also includes communication equipment such as radio, telephone line, and cable, which can be used as the communication channels. And the distributed field devices reside in the substations, which consist of the remote terminal units (RTU) and the programmable logic controller (PLC). The servers and FEP store and process the information sent from and to the RTUs; and the RTU or PLC controls the process of the field devices. The communication hardware allows the information to transmit between the control center and substations. The software is able to tell the system about the time and information to be monitored, as well as the acceptable range of the parameter. The intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) in the substation communicate with the control center. They can also be polled by the local RTUs, and the collected data from IEDs can be transmitted to the control center [20] .
The communication protocols used in the SCADA system are different from those in the corporation network. The SCADA system protocols include the Modbus/TCP, EtherNet/IP, and DNP 3.0, and they are widely used in communications between most control devices. However, these protocols are designed without adequate security considerations. For instance, severe security vulnerabilities are found in the Modbus/TCP protocol, and malicious codes such as worms can be installed in the network if no firewall is considered [20] . Thus, these protocols are only allowed to be used within the networks of the control center and substations, and they are not allowed to cross into the corporation network. In Fig. 1 , cyber networks are constituted by the corporation network, primary and backup control center networks, and 24 substation networks with different degrees of automation which are able to communicate with each other. The control center controls and monitors the operations of a number of transmission or distribution substations. Intercontrol center communication protocols (ICCP) is implemented as the communication protocol between two control centers [1] . DNP 3.0 over TCP/IP is used for communicating control commands and measurements between control centers and substations. The protocol used in the substation is IEC 61850.
The cyber security strategy includes policies of firewalls, the generation of demilitarized zones (DMZ), and the allocation of intrusion detection systems (IDS) along with effective security policies [20] . The policies of the firewalls in this architecture are strict to both communications in and out of the control system. For instance, inbound information to the control center should be blocked, and all communications to the devices in the control center should go through the DMZ. Also, outbound communication through the firewall should be limited to the crucial information. As security requirement is the highest on the control center network, countermeasures with the highest strength are taken within it.
A hardware firewall is used with an isolated DMZ. The authentication server and the security server are combined in the DMZ of the control center. The authentication server is installed, and this is because separate authentication mechanisms should be provided to users of the corporation and control center network. Due to the limited security in the communication protocols in the SCADA, authentication is always forbidden in the remote commands [20] . To resume the authentication mechanism in the SCADA system, the authentication server is added, and the process of verifying the user identity is provided for the remote access control. The security server is the one with the patch and antivirus management [20] . With the security managements in the segmented DMZ, the controlled and secure updates of the traffic can be provided to the control center. The malware which attempts to intrude into the control centers may be different from those in the corporation network, and efficient antivirus products can be selected for the control center protection.
The equipment in the DMZ such as DNS servers and web servers are able to receive requests from external networks, while the firewall of the corporation LAN allows the network to receive only requested data from the external networks. Substations with different structures feature various automation and security levels.
Although firewall or even IDS are applied as security countermeasures in each network, a large number of vulnerabilities such as remote access points are available to the intruders for launching the cyber attacks.
B. Cyber Attack Scenarios and Attack Paths to IED Control
By exploiting the vulnerabilities of the power system cyber networks, attacks are initiated from access points of different LANs of the SCADA system. Attack scenarios through these four types of access points are discussed in the following, which illustrate how adversaries can successfully penetrate into various networks and send trip signals to protective relays for tripping breakers of generators, transmission lines, and loads.
Cyber attacks against the SCADA system may be motivated by financial gain or terrorism. But in order to impact the reliability of the power system, cyber attacks that can manipulate the messages or signals will be selected as the attack scenarios. Only by sending the false commands or status signals, the breakers of the generators, transmission lines, and the loads can be abnormally tripped. And eventually, the reliability of the power system can be affected. The tasks of four attack scenarios all enable the attackers to send the false messages or signals, by improving privileges or inserting the manipulated messages.
1) Attacks on Control Center LAN:
Although it is difficult to intrude into the control center, attacks on the control center LAN are considered here since they may occur in practical environments. In Fig. 2 , a simplified control center LAN is illustrated. After bypassing the hardware firewall with the advanced intrusion strategy without violating the firewall rules, the intruder is able to gain access to the switch with the port scanning approach. When the attacker successfully intrudes into the LAN, he is able to scan the hosts and services of the network by intruding into the historian server without triggering alarms of the IDS. Since the application server is able to transmit the commands directly to the other devices, it is selected as the target of the cyber intrusion. The application server is used to store the point data and send the updated data to other clients, such as the HMI, data historian, and the ICCP servers [21] . The intruder may send the trip commands to the RTUs in different substations. By obtaining the root privilege of the application server, trip commands can be directly sent to the IED relays in one substation through the FEP. The FEP is a server that translates the protocols without checking the authority if the commands are sent from the applications server, and the commands are directly forwarded to remote devices in substations [21] .
2) Intrusion in Corporation LAN: Due to the complicated communication links between the intruders and some substation networks, the attackers may first gain access to the corporation LAN via the internet. Available access points and target components to the corporation LAN can be found in Fig. 3 [22] . The inconvenience of the intrusion into the substation network can be significantly decreased by obtaining confidential inside data or substation login information from the corporation database server. The attacker is able to access the corporation network when the firewall is bypassed. The attacker may first start from the web server and the FTP server, which have more communications with outside components. When the servers connected with database server are breached, the database server installed in the inner zone of the corporation network can be achieved. With the inside data, the intruder will be able to access the HMI in substations and send trip commands with a permitted identity.
3) Attacks Against Substation Networks: Taking advantage of a port-scanning tool or a war-dialer, an intruder identifies active system ports and IP addresses of one substation. He logs on one router using the brute-force password attack, and bypasses the firewall successfully. As the adversary has gained access to the network of the substation, the IP scanning tool is deployed again for the different component user interface intrusions. Unauthorized operations such as trip commands are sent to one or several relays. Since the automation and security levels of the substation LANs differ from each other, various architectures of the substation networks exist.
Three substation LANs with different automation stages and network architectures are considered and illustrated through Figs. 4-6. Substation LAN 1 is composed of the simplest automation stage and the architecture [7] . Since it only deploys the firewall as the countermeasure, the attacker is able to intrude into the HMI and obtain its root privilege if he is able to successfully intrude into the substation LAN 1. The HMI provides the operation and supervision of the substation [23] , thus the attacker is able to directly send the trip commands to the IEDs when the HMI is controlled. Some malicious data traffic can be prevented from flowing into the substation LAN if the firewall is well configured. However, malicious packets disguised as regular packets are allowed to flow into the network by following the firewall rules. LAN 2 deploys a more complicated and secure architecture by separating the substation network into two virtual LAN (VLAN)-based substation networks [22] . An Ethernet switch is used to control the communication between VLANs, and two switches are used to control communication between devices. In order to communicate with the devices in the Bay VLAN, the attackers should also gain the access to the shared server. This indicates attackers should intrude at least two VLANs divided by switches so that the substation HMI can be reached. Unwanted data traffic can be filtered by VLANs, thus this architecture of the substation network is more secure than the architecture of the substation LAN 1.
Substation LAN 3 is a network with higher automation, which comprises a local SCADA for more convenient local or remote control [7] . The local SCADA of the substation is a modular system for communication and control of each component in the substation. It enables the authorized interactions between panels of the substation with specific network protocols or standard industrial network protocols, such as IEC6185, IEC61870, and Modbus/TCP [24] . In this network, the local SCADA is the only component which can be connected to other networks, and the HMI is prevented from directly connecting to the components of the other networks. In order to send malicious commands from the HMI, the attacker needs to first breach the local SCADA and obtain the user privilege, then he is able to intrude into the HMI through the local SCADA.
4) MITM Attack on Communication Links Between the Control Center and Substations:
By accessing the communication links between the control center and the substations, the intruder may install the eavesdropping equipment either in the wired or wireless network [18] . In order to inject the false data into the communication link, the traffic can be monitored by the intruder. A number of messages in the SCADA communications are plain text, which are easy to be understood by the attackers. If the message is encrypted, the attacker may first eavesdrop the message and look for an appropriate decoding approach, so that the information can be analyzed. This may be used in traffic analysis for understanding the traffic patterns in the networks [18] . The measurements or the state data packets are intercepted during the transmission. The intruder then replaces some actual state data with the fabricated data. These false data are sent to the state estimation modules. When the false operating conditions are finally presented to the operators, some operators may be misguided and send the incorrect trip commands to the relays.
III. PRELIMINARIES

A. BN and Attack Graph
Attack graphs represent the dependences among vulnerabilities and potential sequences of attacks [17] . It is a directed graph composed of predefined nodes as vertices, and the directed relationships as edges. The BN are widely used to model the attack graphs in a probabilistic manner, which is effective in quantifying the process and impacts of cyber attacks [18] . BN is composed of a pair G, N , where G represents a direct graph, N is a set of parameters in the network. a i and a j , which are nodes in the networks, are connected by a directed edge. It indicates the value of a j is influenced by the value of a i . It is considered a i is the parent of a j . The probability of each a i is thus associated with conditional probability table (CPT) in N. The unique joint distribution of a i is denoted as
(1)
B. Common Vulnerability Scoring System
The vulnerability of the cyber network of the power system is evaluated by scoring the system security [17] . The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is used to score the vulnerabilities as the probabilities of successful exploits on hosts or devices [18] . CVSS is widely utilized for scoring the vulnerabilities and their relative severity in the networks, and CVSS scores can be calculated via the public vulnerability databases [23] . By assigning various levels to the vectors such as the access vector (AV), and confidentiality impact (CI) in the base scores (BS) equation, fundamental characteristics of the vulnerabilities can be quantified by values 0-10. A higher score implies more severe vulnerability of the component, i.e., the component has a higher probability of being intruded. BS can be adjusted to the temporal score (TS) and environmental score (ES) by considering additional time and environmental vectors. The threat of the vulnerabilities to the components may vary with time due to the upgrade of countermeasures, while the environment is not specific to the users. Thus, the TS is adopted to evaluate the impact of the vulnerabilities.
C. Mean Time to Compromise
Similar to the mean time to failure (MTTF) of the components in the power system, the MTTC is modeled. It is used to estimate the average frequency of the cyber attacks on the components of the power systems [15] . The MTTC measures the efforts (represented by time) spent by an attacker for a successful attack in the statistical form. The concept of the minimal attack sequence is used, which assumes the attack does not consume unnecessary efforts on the attacks [17] . As the MTTC increases, the likelihood and frequency of the successful attack will decrease. With the attack graph and the BN, the MTTC for a state (or condition) is used to reflect the average time required by the attacker to reach the condition [17] . In this paper, the increased privilege is considered as the post condition. In order to reach these conditions, several vulnerabilities should be exploited. The overall MTTC is the mean of the sum of MTTCs of the exploits in this paper. The MTTC can be influenced by different features of the attack scenarios, such as different attack paths, cyber networks, vulnerabilities of the components, and levels of attackers.
IV. ATTACK GRAPH MODEL USING BNS
A. Bayesian Attack Graph Model of Vulnerabilities
In this paper, two Bayesian attack graph models are considered. The first one is the attack graph of vulnerabilities, which describes the probability of successful root privilege acquisition through LANs of the control center, corporation, and substations. Given an attack graph G(V ∪ C) possessing two types of nodes as vertices, which are exploits to vulnerabilities V and component conditions C. The sequence of the exploits composes a minimal attack sequence, which means the attacker is efficient on the vulnerabilities and takes no unnecessary effort on the path to the target [17] . It is assumed that all preconditions of an exploit are either the initial condition or the postconditions of some exploits which have occurred before it. The conditions are distinguished as service (S), which is shown as service(host); connection (N) represented as <source host, destination host>; and privilege (L) denoted as privilege(host). The conditions are either satisfied as initial conditions or as post-conditions [17] . The post-conditions will be satisfied when any vulnerability is exploited. Fig. 7 illustrates a Bayesian attack graph model of vulnerabilities in the control center LAN, which describes the minimal attack sequence to obtain the root privilege of the application server. Vulnerabilities are illustrated by ovals with white or light blue colors representing the known or zero-day vulnerabilities, respectively. One vulnerability can be exploited when its S i , N i , and L i are satisfied. For instance, Dos, 0, 1 represents the zero-day exploit of the vulnerability found in the historian server. Before exploiting vulnerabilities of the server, intruder host user(0) should exist and be connected to the historian server. This means that the privilege user(0) and the connection <0, 1> should be satisfied. At the same time, Dos(1) and Exec(1), which are two services of the historian server, should be available to the intruder. By exploiting two zero-day vulnerabilities of the historian server, the intruder is able to obtain the user privilege user(1) of the historian server. He then obtains the user privilege user(2) of the application server by exploiting the zero-day vulnerability of the ssh service ssh, 1, 2 . Finally, the goal privilege root 2 is reached from the user privilege user(2) in the application server by exploiting the known vulnerability bof, 2, 2 .
The goal of using the Bayesian attack graph model is to determine the probabilities that an intruder will successfully reach the given target condition, which is the post-condition. Three steps are needed to fulfill the task for calculating the probabilities that attackers are able to successfully reach each post-condition. The first step is the estimation of probability that an attacker is able to execute each exploit independently, and it is denoted as p( [17] .
For the known vulnerabilities, p(v i |S i = T, N i = T, L i = T) denotes the probability of the successful execute on each exploit when preconditions are satisfied. Since this probability requires the intrinsic difficulty of exploiting the vulnerability, CVSS scores are used to reflect the nature severity levels of the vulnerabilities [25] . Since the CVSS score ranges from 0 to 10, in order to normalize the values of the probabilities, it is assumed that the probability of successful independent exploit is obtained by
where CVSS(v i ) is the score of the vulnerability which evaluates different configurations of the network. Since various services are available to the communication among components in the LANs of SCADA system, it is assumed that the scores of known vulnerabilities are randomly distributed, which implies a random CVSS(v i ) score is calculated and given to p(
Although they are discovered by cyber attackers, zero-day exploits are executed on vulnerabilities not publicly known, thus it is difficult to find the differences between zero-day vulnerabilities. With the specific configuration of CVSS metrics and scores, a zero-day vulnerability is considered as a special vulnerability with an unavailable remediation level, an unconfirmed report confidence, and the zero-day vulnerability has neither high nor functional exploitability metric [17] . And based on the characteristics of the zero-day vulnerabilities, the vulnerability metrics are assumed as local AV, high access complexity, and multiple authentications [17] , the BS of the CVSS is calculated as 0.8. Thus, the exploit of zero-day vulnerability is assigned with a fixed nominal probability, which is the BS over 10. The probability of successful exploit on a zero-day vulnerability is
Preconditions of the vulnerability are considered in the second step. The BN-based attack graph is built. Except for the node representing an initial condition of the graph, a CPT is developed for each node of the graph and the post-probability is calculated accounting for the CPT [16] . Table I represents the CPT tables of the condition user(1) and the exploit ssh, 1, 2 . Since one exploit is able to be executed only if all preconditions are satisfied, the "AND" relationships should be satisfied if the node is the exploit to the vulnerability. Thus, the exploit ssh, 1, 2 is reached by the conjunction over the conditions <1, 2>, user(1), and ssh(2). The probability of known vulnerability p(v i = T) (or p(v i )) and zero-day vulnerability p(v i ) by considering preconditions are denoted as
where p(S i ), p(N i ), and p(L i ) indicate the probabilities of availability of service, successful connection of two devices, and achievability of the privilege. These probabilities are randomly assigned with values between 0.8 and 1.
Also, "OR" relationships should be satisfied when the nodes are privileges or connection conditions as their preconditions are one or several vulnerabilities. This relationship is satisfied because privileges or successful connections can be gained if any related vulnerabilities are exploited. For instance, the condition user(1) is reached through the disjunction over the exploits Dos, 0, 1 and Exec, 0, 1 . With the probability of successful exploit of each vulnerability leading to its goal condition, the probability that the attacker can successfully reach the target condition p(c) is calculated with the overall probability formula
where n indicates the number of the vulnerabilities leading to one target condition c i , which represents a higher privilege in the following analysis.
In the third step, the probability of a successful exploit leading to its goal condition is calculated. Each exploit to the vulnerability in the minimal attack sequences is denoted as p(v i ∧ c), where c is the goal condition. With the total probability of successful exploit to vulnerability leading to the goal condition, a backward traversal is performed from the target condition to its preconditions, and the probabilities of the preconditions (i.e., p(v i )) are estimated. The ratio of each prevulnerability to the target vulnerability is represented by assuming the attacker will always choose the easiest exploit [15] . In this assumption, the probabilities of n prevulnerabilities to the target vulnerability are sorted in a descending order. Each probability of the successful exploit to the target vulnerability is denoted as
where i indicates different numbers of the prevulnerabilities leading to the target vulnerability. Prevulnerabilities that are easier to exploit will have higher probabilities of being reached.
B. Bayesian Attack Graph Model of Communication Links
The second Bayesian attack graph model estimates the probability of successful intrusion on communication links [18] . MITM attack is launched to the communication link, thus no privilege of the device is needed to reach it. The model is illustrated in Fig. 8 and is composed of three layers. The first layer is composed of the countermeasures, which is denoted by A j . The second layer represents the sub-goals B i , which are denoted by circle nodes. By bypassing or defeating corresponding countermeasures A j , the sub-goals are to be reached. The overall goals are composed of the third layer. The subgoals B i leading to their corresponding overall goals need to be all successfully reached, so that the overall goal can be achieved by the intruders. Circle nodes labeled as C m represent the overall goals, which can be quantified as the probability of successful unauthorized operations on the target communication link.
The middle layer depicts the sub-goals of the attacks, which are composed of sub-processes of the attacks such as accessing the network and intercepting the message. The connections between goals and sub-goals are expressed by AND or OR relationships. In this model, the overall goal C m is achieved through an AND relationship of its sub-goals from B 1 to B n . This is because all sub-goals should be achieved so that the connected overall goal can be reached. For instance, in order to achieve C 2 , both B 2 and B 3 should be reached. The probability of C m is denoted as follows: The probabilities of successfully achieving the sub-goals and overall goals also depend on the implementation of security countermeasures. The difficulty of achieving the sub-goals is influenced by the strength of countermeasures A j . It is applied on various sub-goals B i on the communication links. Reaching a sub-goal with the influences of countermeasures can be quantified as a CPT. It is assumed that known and zero-day vulnerabilities are randomly given on each countermeasure A j denoted using blue and red colors. When the conditional probability of the successful attack on the subgoal is denoted as p(B i = T|A 1, A 2 , . . . , A n ), the probability of the successful attack on the sub-goal B i influenced by its security countermeasures is
It should be noticed that the success of sub-goal B i is not only influenced by exploiting vulnerabilities on the countermeasures A j , but some sub-goals B i are also influenced by the success of overall goals C m . For instance, the sub-goal B 7 (i.e., generating a valid new message) is influenced by the usages of countermeasures A 7 (i.e., signature cryptography) and A 9 (i.e., remote password), as well as the success of overall goal C 1 (i.e., eavesdrop messages). This is because the new information may not be generated correctly if the contents of messages being transmitted are not eavesdropped and analyzed.
The nodes representing countermeasures, sub-goals, and overall goals are listed in Table II. Only if cyber attacks disrupt the integrity of the data transmitted to the IED relays, it may lead to faulty operations of the system breakers and impact the reliability of the power system. Since eavesdropping and traffic analysis are primarily related to the activities which support the faulty operations on the devices rather than the operations for tripping breakers directly, they are not considered as the ultimate goal of the cyber attacks against the communication links. While the faulty operations that manipulate state data and reconfigure the relays are able to trip the circuit breakers, C 3 , C 4 , and C 5 are considered as the overall goals of the attack targeting the communication links.
V. MTTC ESTIMATION OF CYBER ATTACKS ON POWER SYSTEM AND RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
A. Compromise Time Model of Vulnerabilities
By considering the severity of the cyber vulnerabilities, the modified MTTC model in [15] is applied to estimate the average time interval that one vulnerability can be exploited by attackers. The actions of intruders can be divided into three statistical processes. Process 1 illustrates that the attacker has found one or several exploits to one or several identified vulnerabilities. In process 2, no exploits are available to the attacker, although one or several vulnerabilities are identified. It can be found that processes 1 and 2 are mutually exclusive. In process 3, the attacker found neither vulnerabilities nor exploits, thus vulnerabilities or exploits are probed in this process by attackers. Although process 3 is parallel to the previous two processes and runs continuously in reality, it is assumed that this process occurs when processes 1 and 2 are unsuccessful.
In [15] , the probability that an attack is in the process 1, which is represented as P 1 , is estimated by the search theory. The search theory has been used in the physical security systems [26] . The probability that an attack is in process 1 is estimated as follows:
where V is the number of known vulnerabilities in the component being examined. It is assumed that one vulnerability exists in one service entity, thus the number of reachable services is also V. E is the number of available exploits, it is influenced by the skill levels of attackers, values of E are set as 50, 150, 250, and 360 when the levels of attackers are novice, beginner, intermediate, and expert. These values of E are given to indicate the different attack levels, and various values of E may be given if more detailed attack levels are needed. S is the total number of vulnerabilities in the target cyber network. Since information on the vulnerabilities in cyber networks of power system is limited, the value of S is hypothesized based on the national vulnerability database. In this paper, S is assumed to be 7000, which can be updated when the vulnerability database of power system network becomes available with the wider smart grid practices. The mean time of exploit consumed in process 1 is estimated as 1 day in [15] since both vulnerabilities and exploits are available.
If no known vulnerabilities are found on the component, zero-day vulnerabilities will be searched or exploited by the attacker to access the target device. S indicates the properties of components and database, and the numbers of zero-day vulnerabilities and exploits are denoted as V and E , respectively. Since 491 zero-day vulnerabilities are found in [27] , with the same skill levels of attackers, values of E are set as 55, 164, 273, and 393. The probability of exploiting the zero-day vulnerability is calculated by changing the numbers of vulnerabilities and exploits
Since it is assumed that the attackers are familiar with at least one available exploit and vulnerability, the time consumed by compromising the familiar vulnerability is similar for attackers with different skill levels [15] . As at least one exploit of the zero-day vulnerability is directly available to the attackers, the mean time for exploiting the zero-day vulnerabilities in the process 1 is also 1 day.
Since processes 1 and 2 are mutually exclusive, the probabilities that the attacker in process 2 are 1 − P 1 and 1 − P 1 , respectively when the vulnerabilities are known and zero-day types. The mean time consumed in process 2 is estimated as 5.8 days for one attempt of exploit [15] , so the mean time in process 2 is t 2 = 5.8 × ET (12) where ET is the expected frequency of attempts to search for new exploits, which is influenced by the skill levels of attackers. The expected number of attempts is
where AM is the average number of the vulnerabilities needed to create or find one exploit. k is the skill level factor, which is k = AM/V. The proof of (13) can be found in [15] , which identifies ET as a statistical frequency of the exploit attempts. A larger value of the skill level factor implies that more vulnerabilities are exploitable by the attackers. When k becomes larger, the associated frequency will decrease. That is because as k increases, the number of vulnerabilities on the component of interest V is fixed, the average number of the vulnerabilities needed to create or find one exploit AM will be increased. In (13) , the value of the vulnerabilities that will not be used V − AM will be decreased, which makes the number of iterations in (13) decreased dramatically, so that less mean time will be consumed in the attempts of exploit searching. In process 2, the time of the successful exploit development is only influenced by skill levels of attackers. Whether this vulnerability is known or zero day has no impact on the number of attempts because vulnerabilities are known by the attacker in the process.
Process 3 continues until new vulnerabilities or exploits are searched. In [15] , the occurrence of new vulnerabilities or exploits is considered as a constant rate, and the mean time between vulnerabilities (MTBV) is estimated as 30.42 days. Since different types of vulnerabilities are considered in this paper, two MTBV values are assumed. The MTBV of the known vulnerabilities is specified to be 30.42 days and 5.8 days as time intervals of vulnerability and corresponding exploits announcements. More time is needed for discovering zero-day vulnerabilities. Since it is found that the average lifetime of zero-day vulnerabilities is about 130 days, and about half of its lifetime is needed to discover new vulnerabilities [15] . Thus, the MTBV of the zero-day vulnerabilities is extended as 65 days. Since about one month is needed to sell one zero-day vulnerability with corresponding proof-of-concept exploit, the mean time of creating an exploit of zero-day vulnerability is extended to 32 days [17] . Thus, the lifetime of the known vulnerabilities in process 3 is estimated as follows:
While the lifetime of zero-day vulnerabilities in process 3 is
where 1/k indicates the vulnerability rate, which is scaled by V/AM based on the portion of the vulnerability/exploit pairs used by the attack level [15] . The MTBV is multiplied by 1/k, and subtracted by half in (14) and (15). This is because the fault cycle often starts at its midpoint. And a complete lifetime of the process 3 is satisfied by adding the mean time to create the exploit, which are 5.8 days and 32 days for known and zero-day vulnerabilities.
The overall compromise time is estimated by considering the time consumed by all three processes. The time T indicates the average time interval that one known vulnerability is exploited
where t 1 , t 2 , and t 3 are the average values of the processes 1-3. P 1 is the probability that the attacker is in process 1. u indicates the probability of the unsuccessful process 2. It is denoted as follows:
where V is the number of the known vulnerabilities in the examined component, and k is the skill level factor. The average time interval to exploit one zero vulnerability is represented as
where P 1 indicates the probability that the attacker is in process 1 as the vulnerability is the zero-day vulnerability. u is denoted as
where V is the number of the zero-day vulnerabilities in the examined component of the network.
B. MTTC of Attack Paths in the SCADA System
With the models of MTTC of each vulnerability exploit and the attack graph, the MTTCs of the goal conditions in various networks or links are calculated. Since the initial conditions are preconditions that have no vulnerabilities to exploit, the MTTC of an initial condition is set as zero. The post-conditions are goal conditions that can be reached by exploiting corresponding vulnerabilities, thus the MTTC of a post-condition is the sum of portioned MTTC of each exploit leading to the goal post-condition.
Given the attack graph G(V C) and one goal condition c, the MTTC of this goal condition is
where T(v i ) is the MTTC needed on exploiting the vulnerability v i . p(v i ∧ c) is the probability of successful vulnerability exploit leading to the goal condition, which is calculated by (7) . p(c) represents the probability that the goal condition is reached successfully [17] . For the LANs of the control center, corporation, and substations, the MTTC of intruding into the network is the sum of all MTTCs of goal conditions. Suppose n − 1 goal conditions are needed before the final condition (root privilege) is reached, the total time needed to control the target component is represented as
For the attack graph model of the communication links, the MTTC is calculated with a similar approach. In order to calculate the MTTC of intrusion targeting the communication links, the ratio of each exploit to vulnerability on the countermeasures is also needed. The ratio calculation follows (9) by substituting v i and c into A j and B i . Since the sub-goal B i is achieved by exploiting vulnerabilities on the countermeasure A j , the MTTC for realizing the sub-goal is
where T(A j ) is the MTTC of exploiting the known or zero days vulnerability on the countermeasure A j . Based on the AND relationship of sub-target B i and C m , attackers may reach C m by exploiting n connected sub-target B i one-by-one, thus the MTTC of each overall goal is denoted as
Since any of C 3 , C 4 , and C 5 is able to realize the injection of control commands to the substations [18] , the least time spent in reaching one overall goal is used as the MTTC of the attack on communication links.
C. Reliability Analysis
If cyber attacks successfully intrude into the cyber components of the SCADA system, such as HMI in the control center or substations, trip commands can be sent by intruders to IEDs in substations and severe impacts may be resulted in, including unauthorized or faulty tripping of generators, transmission lines, and loads. Further, considering the random behavior of the intruder and the potential isolation action of IDSs, the consequence of each cyber attack can be stochastic. In order to represent this stochastic consequence, a random number of breakers in the target substation are assumed to be tripped after each successful cyber attack. In the SCADA networks such as substation LANs, the process LAN and Dual-LAN networks, the data acquisition units (DAUs) can be used [28] . Different DAUs may be installed in the yard, and data from voltage transformers, current transformers, and status information will be collected by the DAUs. The transformers are controlled by different breakers. The DAUs in the substation will collect the signals at an agreed and synchronized rate. At the same time, each IED relay is able to acquire data from multiple DAUs, the data can be processed automatically by the IEDs. The DAUs are also able to receive the protection commands from various IEDs on the other direction, and the protection devices can be opened or closed. Since one IED relay controls several breakers, the breakers in the substations can be randomly controlled when one IED is controlled.
After each successful cyber attack, the associated physical components will go through a restoration process. The basic idea of calculating reliability index proposed is that cyber attacks are constantly launched and if the attack is successful, the repair process would begin. This matches the real practice as in real scenarios the cyber attacks against power systems are constantly launched, and they will become more frequent in the envisioned smart grid environment. In [29] , many electric power companies were interviewed and they responded that the power system was under constant cyber attacks. It is found that a number of utilities reported daily or frequent attempted cyber-attacks ranging from phishing to malware infection to unfriendly probes. Thus, this assumption is valid considering the fact that electric power systems are in actuality under constant cyber attacks. The repair time mainly consists of the cyber forensics time and physical restoration time [8] .
The mean time-to-repair is denoted as the MTTR. Thus, the probability of a cyber attack is
The reliability evaluation process considering both physical failures and cyber attacks based on MCS is proposed as follows.
1) Model the reliability of physical components, including the generators, transmission lines, and loads. In this paper, the simulation step is 1 h. 2) Model the MTTCs based on the attack type, cyber structure of the SCADA system, attack path, and attack skills, etc. In this paper, the MTTR is assumed to be a constant. 3) Randomly select a physical system state based on MCS. This can be accomplished using a random number generator. 4) Check whether there is a successful cyber attack. This step is conducted by generating a random number within [0, 1] and comparing it with p a . If there is no successful cyber attack, go to step 6; otherwise, go to the next step. 5) Update the statuses of the physical components affected by the cyber attacks. For example, if a generator is successfully tripped, its status will be changed from up to down. 6) Evaluate the physical system state with optimal power flow analysis [30] . 7) If the stopping criterion is met, calculate the final reliability index; otherwise go to step 3. In this paper, the simulation duration is specified as 30 years, and it is sufficient long for the result to converge. In power system reliability assessment, the random failures of physical components could be modeled by MTTF. The time to failure is random and varying as it is primarily determined by the aging process of the physical components, and this random nature is modeled by MTTF. Similarly, the time to compromise refers to the time required to launch a successful cyber attack, and it is random and varying as it is determined by various attack and defense factors. In a same manner, we model the random nature of the time to compromise by MTTC as shown in Section V.
The LOLP used in this paper features the same physical significance as that used in the conventional power system reliability assessment. The concept of reliability most often refers to the system adequacy in the context of probabilistic reliability evaluation. It is defined as the ability of the power system to supply the aggregate electric power to the consumers during the observation period, taking into account the scheduled and unscheduled component outages [31] . From this definition, the reliability index, such as LOLP, is an estimation of the inherent adequacy of the power system. The system adequacy evaluation does not specify that the power outages are only caused by the physical failures. Rather, the reliability index is independent of the outage causes, and it is desirable to include more uncertain factors for achieving a more comprehensive evaluation. While in conventional power system reliability assessment most work is only associated with the physical failures, the cyber attack may also a significant factor for causing the power outages, especially in the cyber-physical power grids. So it should be incorporated in the reliability evaluation of next generation power grids. Our work here is to incorporate the uncertainties from cyber attacks into the conventional reliability assessment framework, and the significance of the commonly used reliability indices, such as LOLP, remains unchanged.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Bayesian Attack Graphs and MTTCs of Targets
By omitting the nodes which represent service (S) and connection (N), and only remaining the most crucial nodes privilege (L) and exploits to vulnerabilities V, Fig. 9 illustrates the simplified Bayesian attack graph of the control center LAN with the minimal sequence of vulnerabilities to be exploited. The attack path between the intruder (host(0)) and the application server (host(2)) shows the processes to gain the root privilege of the application server in the control center LAN. Since it is the attack on the control center, zero day exploits are preferred to prevent being detected. It is assumed that two zero-day vulnerabilities are exploited in the historian (host(1)), which are <Dos, 0, 1> and <Exec, 0, 1>. And one zero-day vulnerability <ssh, 1, 2> is found in the application server. The root privileges of the application server can be obtained by exploiting the vulnerability <bot, 2, 2> to elevated from the user privilege. It is assumed that the exploit <bot, 2, 2> of the application server is a known vulnerability.
The Bayesian attack graph of the corporation LAN is illustrated in Fig. 10 . Due to the configuration of the firewall, the direct communication from the external networks is only available to the web server (host(1)), thus the attacker should first execute the exploit <http, 0, 1> on the web server. Then, by exploiting the FTP vulnerability, the attacker is able to breach the FTP server, and access to the database server from the FTP server. If the second firewall is not well configured, the attacker is able to intrude into the database server through the web server by exploiting the zero-day database vulnerability. Thus, there are two paths from the web server to reach the database server. By calculating the probability that each exploit (<ftp, 1, 2>, <DB, 2, 3>, and <DB, 1, 3>) is successfully executed, the MTTC of the intrusion into the database server user(3) can be estimated. In the attack sequence, only vulnerability of the database server is assumed as the zero-day vulnerability, it is because the database server is isolated and protected, the attacker should look for the advanced vulnerability to prevent the detection.
The MTTCs taken in reaching the target components of the control center and the corporation are illustrated in Figs. 11 and 12 , respectively. In Fig. 11 , it is found that attackers with four levels (novice, beginner, intermediate, and expert) take about 1039, 401, 163.5, and 44 days in attacking the control center LAN. It is observed that as the skill levels of intruders increase, less MTTC of the attack is needed to gain access to the root privilege of the application server.
MTTCs of gaining the control privilege with four skill levels on the database server are illustrated in Fig. 12 . Compared with the MTTCs of exploiting the control center LAN, the MTTCs of intrusion to the corporation are about 734, 289.6, 120, and 39.3 days respectively needed by attackers of four different levels, which are all less than attack intervals on the control center. Although the total number of the exploits of the corporation LAN is more than exploits in the control center LAN, only a single type of zero-day vulnerability needs to be exploited. The total MTTC consumed in controlling the database server is still less than that needed for intruding the target component of the control center LAN.
The Bayesian attack graph of the substation LAN 1 is illustrated in Fig. 13 . The user privilege can be gained by bypassing one firewall and executing two exploits of the vulnerabilities on the targeted HMI. It is assumed that the executed exploits in the HMI are one zero-day exploit < ssh, 0, 1 > and one known day exploit <ftp, 0, 1> respectively. The attack graph of the substation LAN 2 is shown in Fig. 14 . Although a shared server is installed to increase the security, it can be reached by the attacker by bypassing the firewall and the switches. And due to the frequent communications between the station VLAN and the Bay VLAN, known vulnerabilities can be found in the shared server. The attacker may first breach the server and obtain the user privilege by executing the exploit <DB, 0, 1>, and he will exploit two vulnerabilities in the HMI, which are <ftp, 1, 2> and <ssh, 1, 2>, and gain the user privilege of the target component. Also, he may gain the user privilege by executing the exploits <ssh, 0, 2> and <ftp, 0, 2> in the HMI directly. Fig. 15 represents the attack graph of the substation LAN 3. The attack sequence is similar to that of the corporation LAN. Since the local SCADA is the only component that can be remotely monitored or controlled by the operator from the outside network, the intruder can only access the local SCADA. He is then able to intrude into the HMI while the local SCADA is compromised. It is assumed that when one known vulnerability <http, 0, 1> is exploited in the local SCADA, the exploits of the HMI can be executed.
MTTCs of gaining the control privilege on HMIs through three substation LANs are shown in Fig. 16 . For the 24 substations, it is assumed that 12 substations use the network of substation LAN 1, eight substations use substation LAN 2, and four substations use substation LAN 3. It can be found that MTTCs needed for the intrusion into substation LAN 1 is the least compared with that of attacks on substation LANs 2 and 3. The attacker may take about half a month to control the HMI if his level is the expert. This is due to the simplest network structure of the LAN 1. It is also found that MTTC of attacks on substation LAN 2 is slightly higher than that of substation LAN 1, although more exploits are available in LAN 2. This is caused by the multiple attack paths brought by the shared server and the availability of the communication to the HMI. The MTTC of the LAN 2 is about 1.1 times of that of the LAN 1. Also, due to its higher isolating graph structure, largest MTTCs of the substation LAN 3 are calculated even though its vulnerabilities are less than the vulnerabilities in the substation LAN 2. The MTTCs of the successful intrusion on the target component in the LAN 3 may be 1.5 times larger than MTTCs taken on the LAN 1. Fig. 17 illustrates the MTTCs taken on 24 links between the control center and the substations by attackers with four skill levels. Since the known and zero-day vulnerabilities are randomly assigned to the countermeasures of 24 links, the MTTCs needed to achieve the same sub-goal in the attack model can be different among 24 links. However, it is still found that the smallest MTTC of injecting the faulty data to the links is caused by the attacker at the expert level. 
B. LOLP Curves for IEEE RTS79
The test system used for reliability study is the IEEE RTS79, and the MTTR is assumed to be 4 h. LOLP values of the power system are calculated by considering impacts of 14 combinations of attack scenarios. LOLP values are calculated in different attack scenarios, and the combinations of attacks on different networks are listed in Table III . The LOLP curves are illustrated in Fig. 18 .
It is found that the LOLP values are largely influenced by the probability of successful cyber attacks p a on the target components, which are represented by the values of the MTTCs for various cyber networks. As the MTTC of the attack decreases, larger p a and LOLP values will be obtained accordingly. It indicates as the probability of successful cyber attacks on the networks in the SCADA system increases, more severe impact may be brought to the power system. It represents all LOLP values caused by higher level attackers are larger than those resulted from attackers with lower skill levels. It is illustrated in Fig. 18 that all LOLP values represented by the green line are larger than those represented by the yellow line. This indicates that attackers with higher skill levels will bring higher risks to the power system. It can also be seen that LOLP values of the fourth scenario are larger than the previous three scenarios, which is due to the small MTTCs of the substations.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, two modified BN-based attack graph models are utilized to evaluate the probabilities of successful attacks on the power system. By considering different cyber attack paths and skill levels of attackers, MTTCs of successful attacks against various cyber networks or communication links are evaluated. It is found that as more known vulnerabilities are exploited, smaller MTTC is resulted in. Also, less attack time is needed for attackers with higher skill level. The LOLP values are simulated by applying the MCS in IEEE RTS79, where the trips of generators, transmission lines, and loads are increased due to the influence of increased probabilities of successful attacks. It can be seen that as a smaller MTTC of the attack on the target cyber component is needed, the power system becomes less reliable.
In the future research, more cyber-attack scenarios in the cyber-physical power system will be considered and analyzed. More attack targets and countermeasures such as IDS will be incorporated into the Bayesian and MTTC models and the integrity of the model will be improved. A more comprehensive and realistic probabilistic model describing the impacts of cyber attacks will be investigated. Additionally, other factors that may affect the reliability of the power system will be analyzed along with the cyber attacks, and their impacts on the overall system reliability will be evaluated.
